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Taiwan joined the global trend of financial liberal-isation by launching its financial “Big Bang”((2) inthe late 1980s. It was hoped that the financial
sector could significantly enhance its efficiency and com-
petitiveness by reducing state intervention and allowing
market forces to play more important roles. The SOBs,
accounting for the bulk of the banking sector and the
whole financial system, inevitably became the main target
in the “Big Bang”. The Kuomintang (KMT, Chinese Na-
tionalist Party) government decided to undertake two
principal reform measures – privatisation and deregula-
tion – for the SOBs. Privatisation would mean reducing
the government’s shareholding in a bank to below 50%.
Regulations related to state-owned enterprises (SOE)
would no longer apply to these banks((3). In contrast,
deregulation of a SOB would mean keeping state owner-
ship of the bank but freeing it from government red tape
in areas such as budgets, personnel, auditing and so on.
This would only apply to those SOBs that would not be
privatised on the grounds of a bank’s special “policy mis-
sion((4)” or in the event that a bank was experiencing tech-
nical difficulties for privatisation. 
Supposedly, given their importance, the reform measures
should have been undertaken and completed as quickly as
possible. But the reality was quite different. Reform of the
SOBs has been prolonged, lasting over eighteen years. Why
have the reforms been so seriously delayed or why they
failed is what this article aims to address. It proposes that
the answer lies in the rapidly changing political landscape of
Taiwan and in the SOB reform itself. The delayed or failed
reforms, in significant part, stem from the fact that the state’s
ability to control its reform agenda has been constrained by
newly rising political forces as a result of Taiwan’s rapid de-
mocratisation. With a new legitimacy as elected representa-
tives or officials, in the name of checks and balances, politi-
cians have a strong incentive to meddle and self-interest in
meddling with the SOB reform policies. To be more spe-
cific, the interplay among three key policy players, including
the Cabinet (Executive Yuan), the Parliament (Legislative
Yuan), and the Taiwan Provincial Government (TPG),
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1. This article is a revised version of a paper presented at the Third Conference of the
European Association of Taiwan Studies, Paris, 30-31 March 2006. I appreciate the
helpful comments from Fiorella Allio, Frank Muyard and another, anonymous,
referee.
2. The term initially referred to the liberalisation in 1986 of the London Stock
Exchange (LSE) and the following financial liberalisation measures adopted by the
Conservative government in the UK in the 1980s. Later, when Japan pursued large-
scale financial reform in 1998, it used the same term. Since Taiwan conducted
large-scale financial reform in 1989, I will also use the term here. See also Lee,
Lawrence L.C, “The development of banking in Taiwan: the historical impact on
future challenges,” Occasional Papers/Reprints Series in Contemporary Asian
Studies, n˚ 6, School of Law, University of Maryland, 1998.
3. However, the government would still be able to control the bank to some extent as
long as it held onto a significant part of the shares. (It is only after the government
sells all of its shares in a bank that the bank becomes wholly private.)
4. For example, some SOBs are asked to provide cheap credit to target industries. 
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Following the global trend of financial liberalisation, Taiwan’s government has dedicated itself to its own financial
“Big Bang” since the late 1980s. An essential part of this financial overhaul has been the reform of the state-owned
banks (SOBs). It was believed that privatisation and deregulation of the SOBs could effectively enhance the
efficiency of Taiwan’s financial sector. After almost two decades, however, the reform is still not complete. Given its
importance, the question arises: why is it taking so long? This article argues that the state has been unable to
implement its planned reform policies as its ability to carry out the SOB reform has been significantly constrained by
the newly rising political forces resulting from Taiwan’s democratisation. This study highlights the new challenges
and possibilities of financial governance for the state in Taiwan in an era of democratisation, and could be interesting
for future comparative study with other young democracies that also actively undertake financial liberalisation((1).
with its Assembly (TPA), before they were downsized in
1998((5), have together decisively shaped the pace and con-
tent of SOB reform. 
This article is in five sections. A review of the origins of
the SOB reform presents the issue in its initial context. At-
tention is then drawn to the original SOB reform plans for-
mulated by the KMT government at the beginning of Tai-
wan’s financial “Big Bang” in the late 1980s. The ration-
ale behind the policy designs will be explored, providing a
foundation against which later changes in the reform can
be seen. Parts three and four will highlight the impact of
intervention from other political forces outside the Execu-
tive Yuan, the main body of the central government and
the state apparatus, in two main reform areas: privatisation
and deregulation. In these two parts, we will see why, in
addition to the Executive Yuan, the Legislative Yuan and
the Taiwan Provincial Government, as well as its Assem-
bly, were key players, and how their interplay affected
SOB reform throughout the 1990s. The final section sheds
light on developments in SOB reform under the new Dem-
ocratic Progressive Party (DPP) government since 2000.
How this first change in ruling parties may have changed
the nature of the issue will be considered. That is, as Tai-
wan’s democratisation moves to a new level, has this signif-
icantly altered the way in which the SOB reform is to be
addressed? In conclusion, the article looks at the implica-
tions of the reform for financial governance in Taiwan, and
the challenges ahead for the reform as well as what this
can contribute to any comparative study with other emerg-
ing democracies that also undertake aggressive state bank-
ing reforms.Origins of  the r eform (the late1980s)  
The origins of SOB reform in Taiwan involve unprece-
dented challenges that the authoritarian KMT government
faced on both the domestic and external fronts in the second
half of the 1980s. Externally, due to the massive trade sur-
plus that Taiwan enjoyed with the United States in the
1970s and 1980s, the United States forced Taiwan to take
measures necessary to improve the trade imbalance with
threats of unilateral retaliatory measures authorised by the
US “Super 301”((6). The so-called “necessary measures”
could be divided into three parts, the first being to ask Tai-
wan to import more goods from the United States by either
reducing its tariffs or undertaking special procurements for
US products. The second was to ask Taiwan to open its do-
mestic market to US companies. The third was to ask Tai-
wan to significantly appreciate its currency against the US
dollar. As the United States was Taiwan’s most important
export market and closest ally in East Asia, Taiwan had lit-
tle choice but to accept the majority of these requirements.
The second and third parts of these concessions had far
reaching consequences for Taiwan’s financial markets.
Firstly, the introduction of new financial institutions from the
United States posed a threat to the survival of local players,
most of which were under state control. Secondly, the mas-
sive and dramatic appreciation of Taiwan’s currency, the
New Taiwan Dollar (NTD), led to financial chaos as the
KMT government allowed the NTD to appreciate almost
40% from NTD40 : US$1 in 1986 to NTD25 : US$1 in
1989. The huge trade surplus in addition to the surge of
“hot money” from abroad seeking profits from the apprecia-
tion of the New Taiwan Dollar created an excessive supply
of local money, leading to an economic bubble. 
The effects of the economic bubble were fast to emerge on
the domestic front. At the peak of the bubble, the enthusi-
astic participation of the public in speculative investment in
stocks, property, illegal investment companies as well as un-
derground lotteries, etc., could be felt almost everywhere.
Thus, the threat of the bubble bursting and its potentially
disastrous social consequences forced the KMT government
to seek effective financial solutions. 
Even worse for the KMT government were the boiling dem-
ocratic movements that were a serious challenge to the legit-
imacy of its rule at the same time. One of the main chal-
lenges was aimed at the KMT’s party-state business empire.
The DPP, the first opposition party established in 1986,
and other anti-KMT forces fiercely accused the KMT of ex-
ploiting its status as the ruling party by using the SOEs to
promote its own business. Besides this, the low efficiency
and monopoly of the SOEs, which occupied a significant
part of the economy in upstream industries and utility facili-
ties, as well as public transportation, were also under heavy
attack. Demands to swiftly privatise most SOEs and return
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5. Taiwan previously had a redundant multi-tier government structure. From 1946 to 1998,
under the central government, which is located in the national capital Taipei, a Taiwan
province government had charge of all “local” affairs on a territory scale that covered
almost the whole nation. The system was maintained to support the central
government’s claim on the whole of China after the KMT lost the civil war and fled to
Taiwan in 1949. The TPG and TPA were maintained with real function until 1998. A con-
stitutional reform in 1997 passed under the co-operation between the DPP and KMT,
decided to downsize them to empty shells to streamline the government structure. 
6. “Super 301” is the section of the US Trade Act that empowers the US Trade
Representative to investigate US trade partners to establish whether or not they apply
fair and open access to US exporters.
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the KMT’s “suspiciously acquired” assets((7) back to the peo-
ple were building momentum by gaining increasing support
from the public. Thus, the political side reinforced the pres-
sure for genuine and comprehensive economic reform as the
KMT was desperate to boost its legitimacy.
Under such circumstances, the KMT government decided
to push for economic liberalisation on an unprecedented
scope and scale. Not surprisingly, the SOEs and the SOBs
became prime targets for liberalisation. Two key measures of
economic liberalisation were set in motion in 1989. The first
was to set up a cabinet-level task force, the SOE Privatisa-
tion Committee (SOEPC), in pursuing the privatisation of
the SOEs. Shortly after the SOEPC was set up, 20 SOEs
were chosen on the first list for privatisation, among which
eight were financial institutions. The second was aimed ex-
clusively at the financial sector. By significantly revising the
Banking Law, Taiwan’s version of “Big Bang” was unveiled.
Apart from scrapping controls on bank interest on deposits
and loans, the new Banking Law increased the penalties for
financial crime, strengthened the banks’ capacity to manage
risk and allowed the establishment of new private commer-
cial banks, which had been banned for decades((8). Although
this policy did not directly involved the SOBs, the inevitable
competitive pressure brought in by the new private players in
the following years deepened the sense of crisis of the cur-
rent major players – the SOBs.Plan and rationale of  the r e fo rm
If we look at what has happened in SOB privatisation in re-
cent years, we might think that privatisation of the majority
of SOBs has been a consistent policy since the late 1980s.
But this is not the whole picture. At least, under the KMT
rule before 2000, privatisation of the SOBs was, in fact, just
one part of the SOB reform. As mentioned, two crucial re-
form methods were initially adopted: privatisation and dereg-
ulation. For the former, it was believed that a number of
SOBs could get round SOE regulations by becoming “pri-
vate” banks and thus could compete with private players on
level ground. For the latter, while recognising the efficiency
that would be brought by privatisation to some SOBs, the
government also sought to enhance the operational auton-
omy of the rest of SOBs by taking this alternative route.
Plans were made to draft a new act, Regulations Governing
State-Run Financial Institutions (RGSFI), to push for
deregulation of the SOBs. The government argued that for
some SOBs it was not state ownership that hindered their
competitiveness, rather it was the excessive government reg-
ulations. If the new act could be brought in, similar positive
effects as privatisation could take place. The difference was
that with the new act the government could still maintain a
proportion of its banks as government-owned without worry-
ing that they would lose their competitive strength. “State-
owned but run as though privately-owned” was the slogan
that the KMT used to illustrate the spirit of the new act. 
The former minister of finance Paul Chiu((9) recalled why
there was a need for this dual approach in a reply to legisla-
tors during question time in the Legislative Yuan in 1999:
(…) Despite their enormous contributions to our national
economy over the past decades, the state-run financial insti-
tutions (SFIs)((10) have been under immense pressure from
competition from the newly established private financial in-
stitutions from abroad and at home due to the active open-
ing-up of Taiwan’s financial markets by the government in
recent years. (…) Nevertheless, constrained by the existing
government regulations on their personnel, budgets and au-
dits, the SFIs have experienced difficulties in improving
their operational efficiency and have become vulnerable to
the strong and growing challenges from new rivals. Thus, on
the one hand, we have been pushing the privatisation of
some SFIs; on the other hand, for those SFIs that are bear-
ing policy missions or won’t be privatised in the near future,
we will enact the RGSFI [to allow them to gain operational
autonomy and efficiency in another way]((11).
In his later response to questions from legislators, Mr Chiu
gave an example of banks with policy missions. He said that
the government-owned Export-Import Bank of the Republic
of China would not be privatised because it had special func-
tions to facilitate export and import trade of Taiwan((12). He
went on to say that it would take time for some SOBs to be
privatised because they had first to be restructured and reg-
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7. When the KMT government took control of Taiwan in 1945 after Japan was defeated in
World War II, it took over many assets belonging to either the Japanese colonial govern-
ment or citizens. In the age of KMT party-state rule, a significant part of this property
became privately-owned by the KMT itself, planting the seed for the future controversy
about the legitimacy of the KMT’s assets. The dispute continues today. 
8. See the details of the revised Banking Law in the report of Ministry of Finance to the
Legislative Yuan in Lifayuan Gongbao (Parliament Minutes), vol. 78, n˚ 50, pp. 28-31,
1989.
9. In post from 1996 to 2000.
10. Sometimes, the government uses the term SFI rather than SOB as the former includes
other SFIs such as insurance firms and investment companies. As banks account for the
larger part of SFIs, SOBs and SFIs are almost interchangeable terms in Taiwan’s context.
In this paper I treat them as the same.
11. Lifayuan Gongbao (Parliament Minutes), vol. 88, n˚ 33, p. 193, 1999.
12. Normally this was done through offering export credit insurance, re-lending, and other
forms of financing facilities.
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istered again as corporations; when ready, they would be
transferred to private bank status as well((13).
The KMT held formal and full control of state power
through the 1990s at the executive and legislative levels. Ul-
timately, the KMT government failed to deliver these SOB
reform policies as it initially planned. In SOB privatisation,
it completed only a small number after 1997. In SOB dereg-
ulation, the expected RGSFI act was never passed. The de-
lays and failures are explained below. The  delay  of  SOB pr ivat isationin the KMT era  ( the 1990s)  
SOB privatisation and democratisation
As mentioned earlier, SOB privatisation was initiated in the
wider context of all SOE privatisation in 1989. Thus, the
SOB privatisation process was intended to be alongside that
of all SOEs. After announcing its broad direction and plan
for the SOE privatisation, the Executive Yuan took its first
step to implement its agenda in detail providing a legal
framework for the SOE transformation. It proposed to revise
the existing “Statute of Privatisation of Government-Owned
Enterprises” (SPGOE) as the fundamental law for SOE
privatisation. The purposes of the statute are made clear in
the first two articles:
This Statute is enacted to facilitate the privatisation of gov-
ernment-owned enterprises, to exert the market mechanism,
and to enhance the operational efficiency of enterprises (Ar-
ticle 1). The privatisation of government-owned enterprises,
either in whole or in part, shall be governed by this Statute…
(Article 2)((14) Shortly after the statute was approved by the
Legislative Yuan in 1991, the Executive Yuan rushed to
promulgate the “Enforcement Rules of Statute of Privatisa-
tion of Government-Owned Enterprises” in 1992, to guide
involved parties of government agencies, SOEs and their
employees in the application of the SPGOE. The next step,
as planned, after the legal foundation for the SOE privatisa-
tion was in place, was for the Legislative Yuan to review the
budget and plan for individual SOE privatisation as submit-
ted by the Executive Yuan.
As far as SOB privatisation was concerned, five banks were
the focus of the debate before the late 1990s: First, Hua
Nan, Chang Hwa, Farmers and Chiao Tung((15), as the third
column of table 1 shows. The first three were under Taiwan
Provincial Government (TPG) control and the two remain-
ing were under the central government. 
It is not clear why the central government targeted these
TPG-controlled banks first. With hindsight, it might be for
the following reasons. First, in terms of business nature, al-
though the three TPG-controlled banks were government-
owned, their banking business was basically commercially-ori-
ented with few specific policy missions imposed by the gov-
ernment. Second, the government held less than 60% of
shares in two of the three banks, making them relatively more
easy to privatise (i.e., reduction of government share to below
50%). Also, because these banks were holding each other’s
shares to a certain degree, they would be linked in a change
of share structure if any one of them proceeded with privati-
sation. Third, they were all flagship SOBs in terms of their
ranking in assets and market share in lending. If they could
be successfully privatised first, the remaining SOBs would be
easier to address having these three as a precedent. 
Whatever the reasons, the central government’s efforts expe-
rienced serious setbacks from the outset. As soon as the cen-
tral government unveiled the list, the Taiwan Provincial As-
sembly (TPA) passed a crucial resolution in November
1989 that dampened the central government’s hope for a
fast solution. The resolution required that the TPG shares
in the three big provincial banks should be maintained at or
above 51%((16). In other words, it was impossible to privatise
these banks under this resolution as the TPG would always
hold more than half the shares in each. The resolution,
which was in place until May 1997, was the biggest obstacle
to the central government speeding up SOB privatisation.
The main causes of this prolonged block are analysed below. 
Historically, the TPG had enormous power over the banks
under its authority despite all these banks being also subject
by law to the supervision of the central government. The
central government barely intervened in the TPG’s affairs in
this area due to the TPG’s special status and role in Tai-
wan’s politics. The TPG’s jurisdiction was almost totally
overlapped with that of the central government except for
Taipei, Kaohsiung and a number of tiny islands surrounding
Taiwan, and the autonomy of the TPG was safeguarded by
Taiwan’s Constitution at that time. In the face of such a siz-
13. Lifayuan Gongbao, op. cit., p. 197.
14. The full texts of these two articles and of the SPGOE are available on the website of the
Council for Economic Planning and Development (CEPD) at:
http://www.cepd.gov.tw/business/business_sec2.jsp?linkid=191&parentLinkID=3
(date of access: 18 March 2006).
15. Why the Taiwan Business Bank was not mentioned in the public debate about SOB
privatisation is not clear as it was on the list for the first wave of SOB privatisation. A
possible reason is its small size relative to its assets compared to the other three big
provincial banks. 
16. It was a bipartisan resolution. The KMT’s attempt to stop its members from voting for
the resolution failed in the end. See Zhongguo Shibao, 25 October 1994.
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able provincial government, the central government had to
respect the autonomy of the governance of the TPG. In ad-
dition, before 1992 the TPA was the only high-level legisla-
ture where all members were all directly elected by their
constituents in Taiwan((17). The TGA was used as a show-
case for the KMT government to demonstrate to the inter-
national community that Taiwan had democracy at a time
when Taiwan was still under martial law and with limited
democracy. As a result, the power of the TPA was recog-
nised for issues under its supervision((18). Furthermore, prior
to 1994, while all the TPG governors were appointed by the
central government, they needed TPA approval to confirm
their nomination. The power of the TPA could not be un-
derestimated by the central government. Against this back-
drop, when the central government took initiatives to firstly
privatise three SOBs under the authority of the TPG and
TPA, instead of forcing the TPG and TPA to accept its de-
cision, it needed to “convince” them. 
Apart from the tricky central/provincial government relation-
ships, the new political landscape as a result of Taiwan’s
rapid democratisation since the mid-1980s reinforced the in-
fluence of the TPG and TPA. Taiwan’s democratisation
moved to a new stage in the late 1980s after the DPP, the
first opposition party, was founded in 1986 and Martial Law
was lifted in 1987. In appearance, the KMT was still domi-
nant everywhere, but the importance and influence of
elected officials and representatives were surging as people
expected them to play a more significant role in a new dem-
ocratic era. As a result, those newly elected officials and law-
makers started to challenge more often the decisions or or-
17. The Taipei City Council and Kaohsiung City Council also enjoyed the same status but
their constituencies were small in comparison with the TPA. 
18. Because of this special status, many current heavy political figures in Taiwan began to
build their political reputations as members of the TPA. The incumbent Premier Su
Tseng-chang and his predecessor Yu Shyi-kun are all good examples. 
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esTable 1. Progress of privatisation of state-owned banks in the 1990s
ders from the central government or their parties to reflect
the concerns and interests of their constituents. 
The long-upheld TPA resolution of 1989 was one of the typ-
ical examples. The resolution was passed because the TPA
members claimed that they were worried the rights and ben-
efits of the current employees in the three TPG-controlled
banks would not be well-protected after privatisation, espe-
cially when they found that related laws for privatisation
were not in place((19). While it was true that those laws were
not in place until 1992, the TPA members’ lasting opposi-
tion to the privatisation until 1997 implied other reasons. 
Most of all, these banks were convenient tools for TPA
members. With these banks, TPA members could obtain
cheap loans for themselves or their cronies even when lack-
ing sufficient collateral security to back them up. They could
even force the banks to purchase their branch offices in a
specific location with a much higher price, just because
those office buildings belonged to the cronies of some TPA
members. Some TPA members held shares in these banks
and engaged in insider trading on the stock market((20). This
was all because, in the name of supervision, the TPA could
essentially control “their” banks. For example, they could
decide who would be promoted in the TPG-controlled
banks and the budget these banks could be granted at an-
nual reviews. 
The TPG was also negative on the issue of privatising its
banks. The TPG never openly revealed its opposition to the
privatisation but consistently used the TPA resolution to de-
fend itself. Actually, in its own first privatisation plan un-
veiled in 1995, the three banks were not even mentioned in
the plan at all((21). The fundamental reason for this negative
attitude was fiscal problems that the TPG faced. The first
directly elected TPG governor James Soong had even
openly accused the central government of concentrating tax
incomes on its own hand regardless of the fiscal difficulty of
his government and constituents((22). Given that the three
banks’ revenues were important sources of annual fiscal in-
come to the TPG, especially at a time when the TPG was
in serious debt, the TPG was not about to easily let privati-
sation proceed soon((23).
The blocking by the Legislative Yuan of the two central gov-
ernment-controlled SOBs took place in a similar way though
for slightly different reasons after a new parliament was cre-
ated in 1992. Under the strong protest of the public who op-
posed the continuing existence of “permanent((24)” national
representatives in the Legislative Yuan and National Assem-
bly((25) for decades, the KMT undertook political reform
through sending a petition to the Constitutional Court of the
Judicial Yuan for interpretation regarding the qualifications
of those representatives. Consequently, the interpreta-
tion((26) disqualified those representatives in 1991, and Tai-
wan’s first parliament where the lawmakers were com-
pletely and directly elected by their constituents was cre-
ated in 1992((27). The new Legislative Yuan immediately
seized centre-stage. The newly elected lawmakers were all
keen to voice their opinions on public policies considering
the public was constantly watching their performance,
which would affect their chance of getting re-elected at the
next election. 
The central government initiated its privatisation plans for
the Farmers Bank and Chiao Tung Bank in 1992 and 1994
respectively. While it was not very clear why these two cen-
tral government-controlled banks were chosen to be priva-
tised first, based on the way the government handled SOB
privatisation at that time, by releasing its shares in the stock
market, it might have been because these two banks were
listed corporations and would find it easier to sell their
shares quickly. Whatever the reasons, the KMT government
initially assumed these two banks were qualified for privati-
sation and would be processed efficiently. Unfortunately,
most lawmakers had different views on the issue and the Ex-
ecutive Yuan had difficulty in convincing them until 1998.
Although most lawmakers agreed with the direction to priva-
tise the two banks, they expressed their main concerns time
and time again:
These two banks all had special policy missions. Farmers
Bank was for the farming industry; Chiao Tung Bank was
for mid- or long-term development of targeted industries. If
they were privatised, would they continue these mis-
sions((28)?
Economy
88 N o  2 0 0 7 / 1
19. Gongshang Shibao, 15 May 1997.
20. Zhongshi Wanbao, 15 March 1997.
21. Zhongguo Shibao, 14 September 1995.
22. Gongshang Shibao, 17 March 1997.
23. While the TPG could benefit from immediate sale of its shares, it would lose its annual
income from these banks in the future.
24. Permanent because they were elected in mainland China before the KMT completely
retreated to Taiwan in 1949. The KMT used to use these representatives to bolster its
claim over mainland China. These permanent representatives stayed in post for more
than forty years until 1991.
25. This was Taiwan’s second parliament which was mainly in charge of constitutional
amendments and electing the president and vice president before 1996. It was
abolished in June 2005.
26. Interpretation n˚ 261, full text available at:
http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/EN/p03_01.asp?expno=261 (date of
access: 20 March 2006)
27. Before 1992, when some permanent representatives died, the KMT allowed
replacements who were elected by people in Taiwan to fill vacant positions.
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Some precedents showed that SOE privatisation would
transfer shares from the government to a number of private
conglomerates, putting public interests at risk. The two
SOBs might end up in the same situation((29).
The government’s privatisation policies were not complete
while the government only tried to reduce its shareholding to
less than 50%. If the government was really serious about
giving up its control over the two banks, it should sell all its
shares. The government was just trying to free the two banks
from the supervision of the Legislative Yuan after privatisa-
tion((30).
The prices and timing in selling the government’s share in
the two banks in the stock market were improper. The two
banks’ shares deserved to fetch a higher price and their re-
lease should be undertaken under the condition that it would
not affect price levels on the stock market((31).
They argued that before these concerns were properly ad-
dressed by the government, the bipartisan decision in the
Legislative Yuan was to continue to block the government’s
privatisation plan for the two banks.
Poli t ica l  r e forms b roke deadlocks  of  SOBprivatisat ion 
The aforementioned oppositions from the TPG/TPA and
the lawmakers in the new Legislative Yuan notably disap-
peared in 1997 after President Lee Deng-hui launched new
political reforms in 1996 and 1997. After Lee was re-elected
as President – for the first time by popular vote – in March
1996, he felt that there was a need for the whole nation to
seek a consensus about the development of Taiwan in sev-
eral key policy areas such as cross-Strait relations, economic
development and constitutional reform. With support from
the DPP((32), Lee successfully convened the National Devel-
opment Conference (NDC) in December 1996 and put the
political consensus reached at the NDC into practice by
constitutional amendments in July 1997. 
The most important result from this series of political re-
forms regarding SOB privatisation was the decision to down-
size the TPG and TPA by the end of 1998 with almost all
their functions and assets including TPG-controlled banks
transferred to the central government. In response, the TPA
decided to overthrow its 1989 resolution and implement the
privatisation of the three TPG-controlled banks((33). Thus,
soon after in 1998, all three banks including another smaller
bank were privatised as the fifth column of table 3.1 indi-
cates. The success of the reform triggered follow-up reper-
cussions at the Legislative Yuan. On the one hand, the re-
form had set a precedent and all involved parties were satis-
fied with the results((34). On the other, the political climate
pushed the Legislative Yuan to react to the privatisation
issue. Because one of the resolutions passed in the NDC re-
quired that all SOEs should be privatised in five years,
though not legally binding, the Legislative Yuan was under
pressure to follow this requirement. As a result, Farmers
Bank and Chiao Tung Bank all successfully completed pri-
vatisation in 1999. 
The fai led deregulation of  the SOBs  in theKMT era ( the 1990s)
While SOB privatisation suffered serious delays throughout
the 1990s, the other dimension of SOB reform – deregula-
tion – failed completely in the end. Despite repeated at-
tempts, the KMT government was not able to get the Reg-
ulations Governing State-Run Financial Institutions
(RGSFI) passed. At least ten versions of the RGSFI were
drafted by the KMT since the first formulation of the idea
of deregulation in the 1970s((35). However, according to the
study by Lee Yun-san, from the beginning an ongoing dis-
pute among different branches of the central government
meant its enactment was doomed((36).
As the draft of the RGSFI was proposed by the Ministry of
Finance (MOF) under the Executive Yuan and its purpose
was to free SFIs from existing regulations for all civil ser-
vants and SOEs, it ran into strong opposition from other re-
lated governing Yuan: the Control Yuan, the Examination
Yuan and the Legislative Yuan. The Control Yuan had the
power to audit government agencies in the use of their budg-
ets in accordance with their original plans and amounts. The
Examination Yuan was in charge of recruiting civil servants
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28. Gongshang Shibao, 20 May 1997.
29. Ibid.
30. Gongshang Shibao, 30 June 1994.
31. Zhongguo Shibao, 11 April 1997.
32. The DPP shared common political goals with Lee. Most important was the downsizing
of the TPG and TPA. In addition to their concern for better efficiency and governance,
they also wanted to reduce the power of TPG governor James Soong, whose approval
rate among the public was extremely high at that time. 
33. By controlling the agenda, the TPA could be involved in deciding the banks’ share price
and the timing for selling the shares on the market. 
34. The positive reactions from the employees in the four banks were particularly meaningful. 
35. See these versions of different drafts at Gongying Yinhang Quanli Caoan Cankao Ziliao
(Collections of the documents related to the drafts of the RGSFI), Taipei: Ministry of
Finance, 1991. 
36. Lee, Yun-san, “Taiwan Gongyou Jinrong Jigou Quanli zhi Tantao” (On the management
of state-owned financial institutions), in Gongying Yinhang Quanli Caoan Cankao Ziliao
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and their promotions and pensions. The Legislative Yuan
had the power to review all the budgets and plans of gov-
ernment agencies before they were implemented. Unless
the new RGSFI could allow an exception, these Yuan
contended that the Executive Yuan would cross power
boundaries and create a breach of the Constitution. As a
result, the MOF tried to strike a compromise among the
Yuan and different versions of the RGSFI were the re-
sult. Unfortunately, the difference in views was so great
that resolution was difficult. 
While this explanation is convincing in a sense, it does
not explain why an authoritarian regime like the KMT,
before the 1990s, could not co-ordinate different views
on this issue. Perhaps the real cause of the delay in put-
ting the RGSFI into practice is that the KMT did not re-
ally want it to happen before the financial “Big Bang” of
1989. As the SOBs were still very helpful in promoting
industrial policies, excluding largely the participation of
private players in the banking sector and maintaining the
stability of the financial system, the KMT lacked the in-
centive and thus the determination to enact the
RGSFI((37).
To break the deadlock, a constitutional amendment with
regard to the RGSFI was approved by the National As-
sembly in 1994. The article says: 
The state shall manage government-run financial organi-
zations, in accordance with the principles of business ad-
ministration. The management, personnel, proposed
budgets, final budgets, and audits of the said organiza-
tions may be specified by law((38).
The passage of the article stemmed from the strong lobby
pushed by the Association of Banks when sustainable
SOB privatisation was still not in sight and new private
commercial banks just entered the banking sector. The
SOB members of the association attempted to strengthen
their position in the future market by enacting the
RGSFI. 
The latest draft of the act was sent to the Legislative
Yuan for deliberation in 1997. Once again it did not get
through. Firstly the Legislative Yuan was too focused on
SOB privatisation that it did not hold a session for dis-
cussion of the draft act. Then, when the act was finally
discussed in 1999, most lawmakers insisted that there
was no need to enact it if the government planned to pri-
vatise almost all SOBs before very long anyway. Also,
they argued that, as a number of cases of SOB privatisa-
tion were recently completed, all the MOF had to do was
to keep doing the job((39).
The SOB re form in the DPP era(2000-2005) 
The  DPP’s  basic  s tance  before  2000
Before the DPP came to power in 2000, it had an extremely
negative attitude towards both the SOEs and the SOBs. In
its view, the SOEs were inefficient in the economy and pro-
vided special access for profit to the KMT. Taking side with
a number of liberal economists((40), the DPP saw the SOEs
as a burden, their survival lay not in their competitiveness but
in their monopolistic or oligarchic positions in their individual
sectors. If they could be privatised and let other private enter-
prises join the competition, their productivity would pick up
and the whole economy would benefit from improved product
quality and lower prices spurred by open and fair competition
among market competitors. It also denounced the SOEs as
channels for political feedback to some high-ranking govern-
ment officials and military officers after they had retired. Nor-
mally, these retired officials and officers would be granted a
position as chairman or president in an SOE. What was even
worse was that the SOEs were frequently contributing to the
growth of the KMT’s own business empire by providing mas-
sively profitable contracts, an evident symptom of the KMT’s
abuse of its long-time political rule. 
Because of this negative stance, the DPP has upheld privati-
sation as a tool to dismantle the colossal SOEs and under-
mine the KMT’s economic power base. In the DPP’s party
platform, the section on economic, fiscal and financial poli-
cies briefly outlined these goals: The SOEs have to be pri-
vatised and exposed to market competition. In order to get
rid of political cronyism and market monopolies, and en-
hance operational efficiency, this basic principle should be
followed. For some SOEs enjoying monopolistic or oli-
garchic market positions but having difficulties being priva-
tised in the near future, their functions have to be adjusted
and put under the careful surveillance of the legislatures((41).
(Collections of the documents related to the drafts of the RGSFI), p. 150, Taipei: Ministry
of Finance, 1991. Lee was minister of finance in 2002 for the DPP government.
37. I am indebted to Huang Tien-lin for this argument. Mr Huang used to chair the First
Commercial Bank, a top-five SOB, before 2000. He had been a senior economic policy
adviser to President Chen Shui-bian from May 2000 to May 2006.
38. Article 10, Item 4, the Additional Articles of the Constitution of the Republic of China, avail-
able at http://www.gio.gov.tw/info/news/additional.htm (date of access: 26 August 2005)
39. Lifayuan Gongbao (Parliament Minutes), op.cit., pp. 191-231, 1999.
40. Chen, Shi-meng, Lin, Chong-Cheng, Chu, Jing-yi, Chang, Ching-si, Shih Jun-ji, and Liu,
Jin-tian, Jiegou Dangguo Ziben Zhuyi [Disintegrating KMT-State capitalism], Taipei:
Taipei Society, 1992.
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Accordingly, the DPP should have shared a common
ground with the KMT regarding SOE privatisation since
the KMT’s announced policies were on the track that the
DPP wished. In practice, the DPP was also worried that
the KMT might manipulate the process of privatisation for
its own benefit. As the KMT was the ruling party, it had
easy access to inside information about many projects of the
SOE privatisation. In the name of privatisation, the KMT
could either let its own business empire acquire some SOEs
or instead let its powerful partners, the local business ty-
coons allied with it, benefit from similar juicy deals. As a
consequence, SOE privatisation would not end in a health-
ier economy but a lasting twisted economic system under the
dominance of the KMT business empire and its cronies.
Moreover, even after privatisation, the KMT government
could still control most former SOEs through controlling the
majority on their boards as the biggest shareholders. Under
such circumstances, while the “privatised” SOEs were still
under the government’s control, they were no longer under
the monitoring eye of the legislature. Thus, the DPP tended
to insist on a “real” privatisation of the SOEs without any
interference from the government and the KMT in any way. 
The DPP’s concerns were highlighted and addressed in the
National Development Conference (NDC) of 1996 be-
cause the KMT needed the support from the DPP to avoid
the failure of the conference. Under the demand of the
DPP representatives and the widespread support of other
participants, the NDC reached two important consensus
with regard to SOE privatisation and KMT enterprises: 
1. All SOEs have to be privatised in five years.
2. The KMT promises that its enterprises will not take part
in investments that are involved with business in monopolis-
tic or oligarchic positions and government projects((42).
Overall, the DPP’s stance on SOE privatisation before
2000 was cautious support. It embraced the idea of using
privatisation as a means to improve the SOEs in particular
and the whole economy in general. But the worry that the
KMT might exploit its ruling position to benefit from the
process of privatisation made the DPP very careful about it.
Two  stages o f  f inancia l  r eform under  a di -v ided government
After the DPP took power in 2000, the issue of SOB re-
form was reduced to how much and how fast the rest of the
SOBs should be privatised and controlled. Signs have
shown that the DPP government has given up the idea of
enacting new legislation to deregulate a number of SOBs
since the legislation has had no mention since 2000 and
most SOBs are in line to be privatised shortly. But the issue
of SOB reform is no less complicated for the DPP than it
was for the KMT before 2000. No sooner than it came to
power, the DPP faced a looming non-performing crisis and
a significant number of financial institutions were on the
verge of insolvency. It had to sort out the crisis before it
could continue the SOB reform. Besides this, the issue of
“government-run but private-owned” banks needed to be fur-
ther addressed. As table 1 shows, the KMT actually had pri-
vatised eight SOBs before 2000. But these banks were still
run by the government after 2000 because the government
still held a high number of their shares((43). Whether the gov-
ernment should keep reducing its shares has caused new de-
bate about the state’s role in the banking sector. Further-
more, politics in Taiwan since 2000 makes constructive pol-
icy deliberation less likely due to the existence of a divided
government. Although the DPP won the presidential elec-
tions of 2000 and 2004, the KMT and its ally the People
First Party kept control of the Legislative Yuan. The con-
stant confrontation between the opposition “Blue camp” and
the ruling party’s “Green camp” (composed of the DPP
and its ally the Taiwan Solidarity Union) on national iden-
tity grounds and other related issues makes politics more po-
larised than ever. As a result, party discipline has been much
more tightened in all political parties in the Legislative Yuan.
The former bipartisan opposition to the KMT’s Executive
Yuan policies has declined. What has occurred more, in-
stead, is that the Blue overthrows, twists or blocks the poli-
cies of the Green, putting the DPP government in a difficult
ruling position((44).
Nevertheless, as we look back at the DPP’s first term in gov-
ernment from 2000 to 2004, unlike its many policies in
other areas, the DPP’s financial reform policies suffered rel-
atively less from its minority position in the Legislative Yuan.
Despite numerous delays on approving essential bills, budg-
ets or plans by the opposition parties, the DPP managed to
attain notable credit for its financial reforms. The goal of the
first stage of financial reform, initiated by President Chen
Shui-bian in August of 2001, the so-called “258 financial
reform”: to lower non-performing loans ratios to below 5%
41. See the DPP platform, Section 3, Article 7. The original text is in Chinese and available
on the DPP website: http://www.dpp.org.tw/ (date of access: 13 August 2005). The
author’s translation.
42. Zhongguo Shibao, 25 December 1996.
43. As the private share holders were scattered, it was not easy for them to have collective
and concerted actions against the control of the government on these banks, even
though the percentage of private shares outnumbered in total. 
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and raise capital adequacy rates to 8% among domestic
banks within two years was achieved on time. Meanwhile,
following the passage of the Financial Holding Company
Act in 2001, 14 financial holding companies were estab-
lished from 2001 to 2002. In addition, with regard to speed-
ing up the disposal of seriously troubled financial institu-
tions, the Financial Restructuring Fund was established and
has successfully bailed out 47 of these institutions and forced
them to drop out of the market through closure or merger.
Also, the DPP government has overhauled the financial reg-
ulation system by setting up the Financial Supervisory Com-
mission (FSC), an integrated agency aiming at independent
supervision and monitoring of the operation of the whole fi-
nancial system.
With hindsight, two key factors contributed to these better-
than-expected outcomes. First, as a looming banking crisis
approached, the opposition parties were under social pres-
sure to co-operate with the DPP on reform bills and meas-
ures. Although sometimes they disagreed on some technical
matters or worried that the DPP might get too much credit,
they did not totally block the DPP from implementing finan-
cial reform, especially as it attained strong support from the
media and public opinion. Secondly, the convention of the
Economic Development Advisory Conference (EDAC) by
President Chen in 2001 reinforced the mandate of the DPP
reform agenda. The conference took place at a time when
Taiwan experienced its worst economic downturn in
decades. By inviting representatives from the ruling and op-
position parties, scholars, business leaders, and labour
unions, President Chen was hoping to use the conference to
determine common goals and effective solutions to the un-
precedented economic challenges that Taiwan was facing((45).
Conference approval offered such strong legitimacy that no
political party could oppose the items without good cause. 
The conference also sped up SOB privatisation as a consen-
sus reached required that the government-run banks should
be entirely privatised((46). The DPP then focused on reduc-
ing government share in the “government-run but private-
owned” banks. 
Based on the policy accomplishments and consensus
reached in the first term, in October 2004, President Chen
took a further step in consolidating the banking sector by un-
veiling his goal of “the second stage of financial reform” to
halve the number of government-run banks to six by 2005
and the number of financial holding companies to seven by
2006, increase the market share of three domestic banks to
above 10%((47), and encourage one financial institution to be
taken over by a foreign counterpart or listed on overseas mar-
kets((48). The rationale behind this reform agenda, according
to the former Vice Premier Wu Rong-yi, who was commis-
sioned to supervise the banking sector reform in 2005, was
to solve the problem of over-banking and strengthen the
competitiveness of local players by increasing their scale.
The long-term goal of the second stage of financial reform
was to have three to five “national champions” banking
groups that would together have a market share of over 80%.
But as the private players remained wary about merging with
their rivals, the DPP government argued that the govern-
ment-run banks should take the initiative to start the consol-
idation process by merging with other players((49). 
However, the push for the second stage of financial reform
in 2005 raised public concerns and surging opposition from
the labour unions when government-run banks went up for
acquisition by private players. Typical is the failure of the
sale of shares in the government-run Taiwan Business Bank.
The labour union of the bank was not satisfied with the
early-retirement packages for lay-offs as proposed by the pri-
vate bidder E. Sun Financial Holding Co. After a four-day
strike and prolonged negotiations, the bidder dropped its
bid((50). Since then, a controversy has arisen around the way
the DPP government privatises government-run banks.
Some are saying that the government is deliberately selling
out its banks to private players at a low price, which not only
undermines the public interest but also puts the interest of
current bank employees at risk. Against the backdrop of an
increasing income gap between rich and poor in Taiwan, the
government’s rush attempts to sell banks to private conglom-
erates have been viewed by critics as adding fuel to the
fire((51). Seizing this opportunity, opposition parties have
vowed to stop the government from pushing ahead the sec-
ond stage of financial reform, casting more uncertainty on
the reform’s future. The DPP government ended up encour-
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44. The best example is the issue of arms sale deal with the US. As the Bush administration
has approved to sell a number of important weapons to Taiwan in 2001, the budget has
been constantly blocked by the Blue in the Legislative Yuan. 
45. See the background of the conference at a press release from the Presidential Office of
Taiwan: “Background for Convening the Economic Development Advisory Conference”,
available at http://www.president.gov.tw/2_special/economic/e_index.html (date of
access: 14 August 2005).
46. In the common view of the finance group of the conference, which is available in
Chinese at: http://www.president.gov.tw/2_special/economic/index-92.html (date of
access: 14 August 2005).
47. The three banks could be privately or publicly-owned and do not rule out the participa-
tion of foreign capital. The point is to cultivate national champions of banks and make
the banking sector less scattered. 
48. Zhongguo Shibao, 21 October 2004.
49. Gongshang Shibao, 6 September 2005.
50. aipei Times, 15 September 2005.
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aging mergers among the banks it ran and reached its dead-
line to halve the number of government-run banks to six by
2005((52).Conclus ion
As this study shows, rapid democratisation over the past two
decades in Taiwan does significantly affect how the Tai-
wanese government addresses SOB reform. Due to rapid
democratisation, the government has been forced to accom-
modate a new political environment where the power of the
elected politicians at the provincial level (the TPG/TPA)
or at the national level (the Legislative Yuan) has been ele-
vated to such an extent that it puts up constant challenges to
policies formulated by the administrative power centre.
While the impact of democratisation on SOB reform was
more felt in terms of independent behaviour by elected
politicians from all political parties in the KMT era, this
evolved into a clash between the ruling party and the oppo-
sition parties in the DPP era. 
Democratisation has had a mixed impact on SOB reform.
On the one hand, the government has suffered delay or fail-
ure; on the other hand, the accountability of the government
is far improved. The prospect of financial governance partic-
ularly and economic governance generally in Taiwan will de-
pend on whether democracy can further deepen to effect a
balance between governing accountability and efficiency. 
As far as SOB reform is concerned, a major challenge is un-
resolved: the role of government-run banks is not clear. On
the one hand, the majority views agree to reduce govern-
ment intervention in the banking sector, but on the other, as
people are also worried that the influential financial groups
owned by private players((53) might control the sector and put
the public interest at risk, people are expecting the govern-
ment to play a more forceful role as a counterbalance. If the
government keeps selling off its share in the banks it still con-
trols, it will lose a strong leverage against the dominance of
big private players from abroad or at home. 
In sum, SOB reform in Taiwan is at a crossroads. In a new
democratic era, the rapidly changing political landscapes be-
hind the reform and the shifting public opinions on the issue
have made it more complicated and controversial. As Tai-
wan is not alone in undertaking SOB reform along with de-
mocratisation, this case study is just the first step for future
comparative studies on the politics of financial reform. Sim-
ilar patterns, common factors or major differences might be
discovered as a result of comparing Taiwan with other young
or emerging democracies that also undertake large-scale fi-
nancial reforms. •
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51. A social movement group, Fanzi Lianmeng [Alliance of fairness and Justice], is one of
the most active critics. See its view on the issue on its website: http://www.justice.
org.tw/index.htm
52. The six government-run banks are the First Financial Holding Company (FHC), Hua-Nan
FHC, Mega FHC, Bank of Taiwan, Taiwan Cooperative Bank, and Land Bank of Taiwan. 
53. In the financial sector, there are three influential family financial groups: the Koo family
with Chinatrust FHC (n˚ 7) and China Development FHC (n˚ 12), the Wu family with
Taishin FHC (n˚ 2) and Shin Kong FHC (n˚ 8), and Tsai family with Cathay FHC (n˚ 1) and
Fubon FHC (n˚ 6). The numbers behind these FHCs are their rankings in terms of total
assets among the 14 FHCs in Taiwan. Politically, these families are active in maintaining
their relationships with all the main political parties. Their influence is persistent no
matter which party is in power. 
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